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International economists often refer to multinational enterprises and foreign rms
interchangeably, yet one of the enduring divisions in the globalization debate is whether
international law should be strengthened to protect foreign rms from predatory host
governments, or rather strengthened to protect host governments from powerful multi-
national rms. We contribute to this debate conceptually by distinguishing between
foreign rms and multinational rms. We then use rm level data on government-rm
relations from eighty countries to contribute empirical evidence on the debate. We nd
that multinational rms (both foreign and local) are indeed relatively inuential over
government, and nd no evidence that foreign rms (multinational or otherwise) suer
signicant disadvantages in terms of self-reported inuence.
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\The ultimate subject and sovereign ruler of the world is the transnational
corporation, operating by collective prescription and enforcement through the
World Trade Organization in concert with its prototype the NAFTA, its Eu-
ropean collaborator, the EU, and such derivative regional instruments as the
APEC, the MAI, the FTAA, and so on.
Together these constitute the hierarchical formation of the planet's new rule
by extra-parliamentary and transnational at."
(John McMurtry 2002, p.202)
As with many aspects of globalization, the debate over the relationship between for-
eign rms and host governments seems to suggest that the two sides are living in parallel
worlds with diering objective realities. On the one hand critics of globalization believe
multi-national corporations are extremely politically powerful and are `writing the rules' of
globalization to suit their own balance sheets at the expense of the rest of society. On the
other side are those who believe foreign rms suer substantial political risk. The question
we address is also pre-eminent for policy-makers considering design of and participation in
international investment agreements. Indeed, some commentators believe that the rapid
spread of international investment agreements and associated strengthening of the rights of
foreign investors is evidence of the increasing power of multinational corporations relative to
nation states since the late nineteen eighties (Sornarajah 2006) (Mann 2006). The intention
of this paper is to consider some objective empirical evidence on the debate over whether
foreign rms are powerful or persecuted.
Vernon's (1980) obsolescing bargaining model of government-multinational relations was
motivated by the wave of nationalizations by developing countries of foreign rms in the
resource sector in the nineteen seventies. More recent contributions to this literature have
broadened the view of government-rm bargaining to other sectors such as manufacturing
(Kobrin 1987) and broadened and adapted the theory toward a political bargaining model to
reect the signicantly less adversarial nature of government-rm relations in recent decades
(Eden et al. 2005). The empirical contributions to this literature test the importance of
various sources of rm or host bargaining power for bargaining outcomes such as ownership
shares of foreign rm-host government joint ventures.1 However, being predominantly an
1See for example Fagre and Jr. (1982), Lecraw (1984), Kobrin (1987), Gomes-Casseres (1990) and Lee
(2004).
2international management literature, there has been little attention paid to the question of
how well international rms fair in their dealings with governments relative to local rms.
Another strand of the management literature, developed by authors such as Zaheer (1995)
focuses on the liabilities of foreignness arising from cultural and institutional dierences be-
tween the rm's home and host countries. This literature diers from the MNE-government
bargaining literature both in so far as it focuses on investments into developed rather than
developing countries, and in that some empirical contributions do directly test for evidence
of a liability of foreignness relative to local rms (Luo and Mezias 2002).
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. Firstly, it looks at the government-
rm relationship across a cross-section of countries with broadly diering institutions and
levels of income without making assumptions about the implications of these country features
for rm-level determinants of inuence. Secondly - and more importantly - we help ll a gap
identied by Zaheer (2002) by paying more attention to what is meant by `foreign' versus
`local' rms and examine separately the implications of a rm's foreignness and its status
as a multinational. Zaheer particularly noted that foreign multinationals may be competing
against both purely domestic rms and local rms who are themselves multinationals. In
this paper, we go beyond this to also consider the converse case - that not all `foreign rms'
consider themselves part of a multinational.
The idea that foreign rms may be competing against locally-based multinationals is
uncontroversial. However, the idea that rms with substantial foreign ownership may not
actually consider themselves part of a multinational requires some elaboration. The standard
denition of a multinational enterprise (MNE) is a rm which engages in foreign direct
investment (FDI) \dened as investments in which the rm acquires a substantial controlling
interest in a foreign rm or sets up a subsidiary in a foreign country." (Markusen 2004)
\Multinational enterprises (MNE) are rms that engage in foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI), d' (James Markusen, 2004, p.5)
As a general rule in the empirical literature in either economics or management, any rm
with more than a certain percentage (ranging from ten to fty percent) foreign ownership is
considered a foreign-owned rm, a label which is used inter-changeably with `multinational
subsidiary' or simply 'foreign rm'.2
2See for example Albornoz et al. (2009), Heyman et al. (2007) and Dasgupta et al. (2000).
3The reason for this is partly that in most datasets it is not possible to distinguish between
portfolio-type investment - in which the foreign party primarily provides funds - and direct
investment - in which a foreign rm brings with it specic resources and capabilities such as
management style or technology.
Our analysis uses the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the
World Bank across 80 countries in 1999-2000. One of the advantages of the WBES for the
current analysis is that in addition to asking rms about foreign ownership, it allowed rms
to self-identify as part of a multi-national. Our results suggest that the distinction between
mere foreign-ownership and foreign-subsidiarity is important to the relationship with the
host government.
Our analysis begins in Section 3 by considering the inuence that rms believe they have
over government decisions of importance to their operations. For comparison with the pre-
vious literature, we rst consider the importance of foreign ownership without accounting
for multinationality of the rm. Consistent with the ndings of Chong and Gradstein (2007)
using the same data source, we nd no correlation between foreign ownership and perceived
inuence after controlling for other features such as rm size, age, sector and country of oper-
ation. We then exploit the additional information in the WBES data and control for whether
the rm has holdings or operations in other countries (i.e. is a part of a multinational). We
nd multi-nationality is strongly positively correlated with inuence, while foreign owner-
ship remains insignicant in most regressions. Overall our ndings with regard to inuence
strongly support the view of the critics of `corporate globalization' - that multinational rms
are highly inuential - and provide no evidence of any liability of foreignness.
2. Data
The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) is a survey of over 10,000 rms in 80
countries and one territory conducted in 1999-2000 that examines a wide range of interactions
between rms and the state. Based on face-to-face interviews with rm managers and
owners.3 The survey covers a large range of questions concerning the rm's relationship with
the government, including perceptions of regulations, corruption, inuence, macroeconomic
policies, competition, and infrastructure. We use data from all countries except those in
Africa and the Middle East as these regions do not have data on rm beliefs about inuence
3Permanent url http://go.worldbank.org/RV060VBJU0
4on government.
2.1 Inuence over Government
The dependent variable in our regressions is the self-reported inuence which rms believe
they have over various branches of the national government in the country in which they
are operating. Specically, the WBES asked rms for each of the Executive, Legislature,
Ministry and Regulatory Agency:
\When a new law, rule, regulation, or decree is being discussed that could have a
substantial impact on your business, how much inuence does your rm typically
have at the national level of government on the content of that law, rule, regula-
tion or decree? Would you say very inuential, frequently inuential, inuential,
seldom inuential or never inuential?"
2.2 Foreign Firms
The distinction between foreign rms and multinational rms is important to our analysis.
The two terms are often used interchangeably in the academic literature, however, in public
discourse critics of globalization tend to refer to multinationals and proponents to foreign
rms. In the WBES data, we are able to independently identify multinational status (rms
who answered `yes' to the question \Does your rm have holdings or operations in other
countries?") and foreign status (rms who answered `yes' to the question \Does any foreign
company or individual have a nancial stake in the ownership of your rm?"). From this
information we construct four mutually exclusive types of rm: purely local rms (the refer-
ence group in our regressions), multinationals operating in their home country (MNC Home),
subsidiaries of foreign multinationals (MNC foreign), and rms with foreign ownership that
do not identify as part of a multinational (Foreign non-MNC).4
While the academic literature tends to equate multinationals and foreign ownership,
the WBES data suggests this is not founded. Of the 1,822 rms reporting some foreign
ownership 878 - a little less than half - report that the rm has operations of holdings in
4\MNCs home" is coded 1 for all rms who answered `yes' to the question of whether their rm had
holdings or operations in other countries, and `no' to the question of whether they had foreign ownership.
\MNCs foreign" is coded 1 for all rms who answered `yes' to both these questions. \Foreign nonMNC"
is coded 1 for all rms who answered `no' to the other country question but `yes' to the foreign ownership
question. Thus these three categories are mutually exclusive.
5other countries. Conveniently for our analysis, there is also a similar number of rms (847)
which report having holdings or operations in other countries but do not claim any foreign
ownership. Thus we have roughly equal numbers of rms classied as MNC Home, MNC
Foreign and Foreign non-MNC.
2.3 Firm-level Control Variables
Other controls included in our base regression are: Government ownership (partial or full)
and export status which are binary (0;1) variables. Size, coded 1   3 for small (5   50
employees), medium (51   500 employees) and large (> 500 employees). Firm age is also
categorical in three groups 0 5, 6 20, and more than 20 years rm age. Capital intensity
as measured by reported value of sales to xed assets ratio and country dummies is also
included.
Summary statistics for the variables used are presented in the tables below. From Table
1 we see that there are roughly equal numbers of multinationals in their home country,
multinationals in a foreign country, and foreign rms which are not part of a multinational.
Each of these make up 7   8% of the sample making it just sueint to identify their co-
ecients. Roughly 12% of rms have some government ownership and 33% of rms export.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
MNC at Home 0.073 0.261 0 1 8149
Foreign MNC 0.081 0.272 0 1 8149
Foreign non-MNC 0.086 0.281 0 1 8149
Govt. Ownership 0.125 0.331 0 1 8057
Exporter 0.327 0.469 0 1 7996
Size Category 1.752 0.721 1 3 8132
Age Category 2.047 0.816 1 3 7956
Table 1: Summary of Firm Characteristics
Table 2 shows that the average level of inuence rms feel they have over all four branches
of government is roughly equal at around 1:6   1:7, suggesting that the average rm feels
it is somewhere between \never" and \seldom" inuential. Similarly, the average rm feels
that - across all areas of activities - government intervention occurs \seldom".
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the responses to the questions about dierent
types of regulatory constraint. It is clear from these statistics that high taxes, followed by
tax regulation and administration are the most constraining forms of regulation, with the
6Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Inuence Executive 1.659 1.016 1 5 6095
Inuence Regulator 1.701 1.034 1 5 5971
Inuence Legislature 1.617 0.987 1 5 6104
Inuence Ministry 1.656 1.012 1 5 6094
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Inuence Measures.
average rm reporting them to be a moderate obstacle (around 3 on a 4 point scale). The
other regulations are all a minor obstacle (around 2 on a 4 point scale) on average. In
order of decreasing constraint they are: Customs and Trade Regs., Labour Regs., Business
Licensing, Environment Regs., Foreign Exchange Regs., and Fire and Safety Regs. For those
interested in the \race-to-the-bottom" debate, it is interesting to note that a country's own
customs and trade regulations are viewed by the average rm as more of a constraint than
its environmental regulations.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Environment Reg. 2.013 1.02 1 4 7710
Business Licensing 2.102 1.081 1 4 7821
Customs, Trade Reg. 2.179 1.081 1 4 6882
Labour Reg. 2.176 1.059 1 4 7990
Foreign Exchange Reg. 1.915 1.051 1 4 7237
Fire, Safety Reg. 1.879 0.941 1 4 7903
High Taxes 3.286 0.987 1 4 7985
Tax Regs., Admin. 2.771 1.072 1 4 8029
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Regulatory Constraint Measures
2.4 Empirical Approach
Our ambition in this paper is not to test causal relationships. Rather, we suggest that there
is much insight to be gained through regression analysis which allows us to examine the
correlation between foreign ownership and/or multinational status and various measures of
interaction with government, controlling for other observable characteristics (such as size)
which may be correlated with foreign/MNC status. Our base regression is of the form:
Relationship = f(mnch, mncf, fnmn, exp, gvt, size, age, sec, skr, country) (1)
7Where the Relationship measures relate to either Inuence or Regulatory Constraint and are
dened in Section 2.
The right hand side variables with their short, medium and long descriptions are as per
Table 2.4:
Short: Medium: Long
mnch: MNC at Home: Multinational rm operating in home
country
mncf: MNC Foreign: Multinational rm outside home/MNC
subsidiary
fnmn: Foreign non-MNC: Foreign owner not having operations in
other countries
exp: Exporter: Export some proportion of output
gvt: Govt. Ownership: Some government ownership of rm
size: Medium/Large: Dummies for size categories





skr: Sales to Capital: Value of sales to Fixed Assets
country: Country: Country dummies
Table 4: Explanatory variable names and descriptions.
3. Influence over Government
We begin our analysis by examining the relationship between foreignness and perceived
inuence over government. The dependent variable in Table 5 is the average of the inuence
rms perceive they have over all four arms of government: Executive, Legislature, Ministry
and Regulator. The sample here includes rms from all sectors, and dummies for each sector
are included.
Column 1 of Table 5 is similar to the existing literature in that it controls for foreignness
purely on the basis of ownership. In this specication there is no statistically signicant
relationship between foreignness and inuence over government. In columns 2 and 3 of
Table 5 we exploit the information about multi-nationality of the rm which the WBES
contains. In column 2 we simply add the control for multi-nationality and nd that while
foreign ownership remains insignicant, being a part of a multinational rm is strongly
and signicantly correlated with higher perceived inuence over government. In column
83 we use the foreign-ownership and multi-national variables to create three four mutually
exclusive groups, multi-nationals operating in their home country, multi-nationals operating
in a foreign country (i.e. subsidiaries), rms with foreign ownership which do not identify as
part of a multi-national, and the excluded category is purely domestic rms. The results in
column 3 conrm that foreign ownership on its own has no relationship with inuence, and
that while both parent and subsidiary multinationals have higher than average inuence, the
magnitude of the coecient for parents (i.e. MNCs in their home country) is almost double
that of the one for multi-national subsidiaries.
One interesting observation is that rm age is not correlated signicantly with inuence
in columns 1-3 of Table 5. This lack of correlation may indicate that a rm's age does not
aect its ability to inuence government, or it may be because the inuence of dierent
types of rms evolves dierently over time. In particular, we might expect the inuence of
domestic rms to increase over time as they become more politically entrenched. On the
other hand, there is a signicant literature dating back to Caves 1971 debating the existence
of an obsolescing bargain between foreign multinationals and host governments. The ob-
solescing bargain hypothesis would suggest that the inuence of foreign rms is decreasing
over time. In Column 4 of Table 5 we interact the age categories with the multinational
and foreign variables. The results suggest that the inuence of dierent types of rms does
indeed evolve dierently over time. The coecients on the non-interacted age category dum-
mies suggest that for purely domestic rms inuence rst decreases and then increases with
age. This may reect a balance between government desire to support innovation and the
political entrenchment of older rms. For domestic multinationals, however, the trend is
monotonically toward more inuence with age. Indeed the coecient for the non-interacted
multinational-in-their-home-country variable is insignicantly dierent from zero, suggesting
that local multinationals only gain inuence relative to their fellow domestic rms with age.
Foreign multinationals - on the other hand - are inuential from the beginning. Further-
more, the negative but not particularly signicant co-ecients on the age interaction terms
for foreign multinationals provides weak evidence in support of an obsolescing bargain. The
signs of the coecients for foreign non-multinationals follow the same pattern as those for
foreign multinationals, however none of them are statistically signicant.
Full regression results for all controls included in the regressions which are summarized
in Table 5 are given in Table 13 in the Appendix. With reference to Table 13, it is reas-
suring to note that the coecients on the other controls have the signs one might expect.
Size and government ownership are the most strongly positively correlated with inuence,
9followed by exporting. In terms of sectors, rms in services, construction and agriculture
all report signicantly more inuence than the excluded category of manufacturing. Since
these coecients are robust and not our primary interest in this paper, they are generally
not reported in the rest of the tables in the body of this paper.5
The results in Table 6 show how the relationship between the dierent measures of foreign-
ness and inuence varies according to the branch of government in question. Multinationals
in their home country appear to be consistently highly inuential across all branches of gov-
ernment. Interestingly foreign ownership, for both multinationals and non-multinationals,
appears to be associated with relatively lower inuence over elected branches of government
(executive and legislature) than the bureaucratic branches (ministry and regulator). This
lends some support to the idea that popular anti-foreign sentiment decreases the inuence
of foreign rms.
The primary objectives of the government-rm relationship vary among the sectors, thus
it would be reasonable to believe that the pattern of inuence varies also. The results in
Tables 7 and 16 provide evidence which supports this hypothesis. In particular, all of the
globalization-related attributes (multi-nationality, foreignness and exporting) play a more
positive role with regard to inuence over government in the services sector than they do
in manufacturing. Indeed in manufacturing none of these coecients are statistically sig-
nicant. Reference to Table 16 in the Appendix shows that the other controls (government
ownership, size and age) all play a more important role in the manufacturing sector than they
do in the services sector. We will return to the discussion of dierent patterns of inuence
across sectors later when considering the rms' perceptions of regulatory constraints.
To summarize with regard to rm perceptions of their inuence on government: we
nd strong evidence that multinationals are more inuential than comparable rms and no
evidence that foreign rms are less inuential than purely domestic rms. In the services
sector foreign multinationals appear to be less inuential than local multinationals, but they
are still signicantly more inuential than other types of rms. In the services sector foreign
non-multinationals are also signicantly more inuential than similar purely domestic rms.
Dierent patterns of inuence across dierent branches of government and dierent evolution
of inuence over time suggest that the source of inuence varies between local and foreign
multinationals.
5The interested reader may, however, nd the full set of regression results in the Appendix.
10Table 5: Firm Characteristics and Average Inuence on Government. Full results including
cut points are reported in Table 13.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nc av nc av nc av nc av
Foreign Ownership 1.081 0.987
(0.0789) (0.0767)
Exporter 1.315 1.271 1.256 1.259
(0.0830) (0.0813) (0.0802) (0.0804)
Govt. Ownership 1.767 1.794 1.790 1.784
(0.150) (0.153) (0.152) (0.152)
Middle age 0.892 0.899 0.895 0.880
(0.0593) (0.0599) (0.0595) (0.0646)
Old 1.178 1.185 1.178 1.199
(0.0879) (0.0888) (0.0877) (0.100)
MNC 1.339
(0.107)
MNC at Home 1.436 0.868
(0.147) (0.232)
Foreign MNC 1.263 1.518
(0.122) (0.318)
Foreign non-MNC 1.071 1.168
(0.105) (0.220)
MNC Home X Mid-age 1.957
(0.631)
MNC Home X Old 1.700
(0.497)
MNC Foreign X Mid-age 0.913
(0.236)
MNC Foreign X Old 0.731
(0.175)
Foreign non-MNC X Mid-age 0.893
(0.215)
Foreign non-MNC X Old 0.882
(0.209)
Observations 5975 5938 5990 5990
Exponentiated coecients; Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
11Table 6: Firm Characteristics and Inuence on Dierent Branches of Government. Full
results including cut points are reported in Table 15.
Executive Legislator Ministry Regulator
MNC at Home 1.427 1.465 1.469 1.338
(0.148) (0.151) (0.150) (0.138)
Foreign MNC 1.219 1.169 1.284 1.279
(0.120) (0.117) (0.124) (0.122)
Foreign non-MNC 0.979 0.966 1.053 1.180
(0.101) (0.0971) (0.109) (0.114)
Exporter 1.191 1.223 1.282 1.239
(0.0785) (0.0813) (0.0853) (0.0820)
Govt. Ownership 1.766 1.685 1.948 1.458
(0.163) (0.157) (0.179) (0.134)
Observations 6074 6071 6047 6058
Exponentiated coecients; Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 7: Firm Characteristics and Inuence on Government by Sector of Firm. Full results
including cut points are reported in Table 16.
Manuf. Services Agri. Constr.
MNC at Home 1.077 1.732 0.306 3.350
(0.178) (0.246) (0.451) (1.953)
Foreign MNC 1.238 1.303 1.983 1.835
(0.182) (0.184) (1.103) (1.164)
Foreign non-MNC 0.789 1.295 2.059 2.190
(0.117) (0.192) (1.043) (1.058)
Exporter 1.141 1.403 1.586 0.838
(0.114) (0.136) (0.625) (0.321)
Govt. Ownership 1.920 1.673 1.754 1.274
(0.276) (0.219) (0.636) (0.505)
Observations 2135 2855 458 498
Exponentiated coecients; Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
124. Foreign Firms, MNCs and Regulatory Constraint
Presumably rms desire inuence over governments in order to be able to obtain favorable
operating conditions. An excellent indicator of how favorable rms nd their operating
conditions is provided by the WBES survey question on how much of a constraint rms
perceive various types of regulation to be. In this section we examine the pattern of rm
responses to this question. Table 8 reports the regression results for a number of the dierent
types of regulatory constraint for rms in all sectors. It is reassuring to note that the results
for our various types of international rm are consistent with our interpretations of the
denitions of these groups. For example, a related literature nds that foreign rms pay
higher wages than domestic rms, which may lead us to expect that they are less constrained
by labour regulations. Here we nd that Foreign non-MNCs t our expectation but Foreign-
MNCs do not. This could be explained by the fact that labour regulations cover more
than simply wages, and Foreign-MNCs are more likely to be aected by constraints on the
employment of foreign nationals than non-MNC foreign-owned rms. As we might expect, all
three types of rm nd customs and trade regulations more constraining than the comparable
domestic rm. Interestingly, Foreign-MNCs do not seem to face the same problem with
foreign exchange regulations. This may be because MNCs can exploit internal trading and
transfer pricing within the rm to minimize exposure to restrictive foreign exchange policies
of host countries. The use of intra-rm trading would also explain that Foreign MNCs are the
only group who nd high taxes signicantly less of a constraint than other comparable rms.
Finally it is interesting to see that all three types of international rms nd environmental
regulations less of a constraint that comparable purely domestic rms, though this result
is only weakly statistically signicant. Furthermore it seems that multinational status is
more important to lowering perceived environmental constraint than foreignness. This is
interesting in light of the substantial literature which nds that foreign rms tend to have
better environmental performance. This literature, however, is generally not able to control
independently for multi-nationality.
Tables 9 and 10 summarize the results for the regulatory constraint variables where the
sample is restricted to the manufacturing and services sectors respectively. Dividing the
sample by sector shows that most of the signicant results with regard to international rms
are driven by one sector only. For example the advantage of non-MNC foreign rms with
regard to labor regulations arises purely from manufacturing rms while the advantages of
MNC foreign rms with regard to environmental regulations and avoidance of high taxes is
13Table 8: Firm Characteristics and Perceived Regulatory Constraint. Full results including
cut points are reported in Table 18.
Envt. Labor Trade ForEx H.Tax TaxAd.
MNC at Home -0.155 0.0479 0.380 0.274 -0.0874 0.104
(0.0915) (0.0882) (0.0841) (0.0913) (0.0958) (0.0867)
Foreign MNC -0.173 -0.0732 0.233 0.145 -0.356 -0.0700
(0.0906) (0.0905) (0.0904) (0.0899) (0.0920) (0.0855)
Foreign non-MNC -0.119 -0.219 0.258 0.231 -0.110 -0.0770
(0.0812) (0.0817) (0.0792) (0.0845) (0.0893) (0.0827)
Exporter 0.0326 0.0519 0.489 0.268 -0.0943 -0.0273
(0.0590) (0.0582) (0.0581) (0.0604) (0.0622) (0.0564)
Govt. Ownership -0.0186 -0.117 -0.259 -0.217 -0.503 -0.277
(0.0788) (0.0767) (0.0831) (0.0858) (0.0839) (0.0755)
Observations 6645 6886 5875 6191 6883 6918
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
driven purely by the service sector.
Considering the results for the inuence and regulatory constraint regressions together
- it does not appear likely that the inuence of international rms is responsible for their
sometimes signicantly lower levels of regulatory constraint. Non-MNC foreign rms were
relatively less inuential in the manufacturing sector, yet this is the only sector in which they
are signicantly less constrained by any form of regulation. Conversely MNC foreign rms
were relatively more inuential in the manufacturing sector, but their regulatory advantages
appear in the services sector. We examine the relationship between inuence and regulatory
constraint more directly in Table 11.
The results in Table 11 do not lend any support to the idea that rms are able to use
their inuence to achieve reduced regulatory constraint. For some of the regulatory types the
inuence variable is insignicant, and for others it is signicant with the wrong sign. That
is, for some of the regressions it appears that greater inuence is associated with higher
regulatory constraint. This `wrong' sign suggests an endogeneity problem. We suggest that
the source of this problem is the omission of any variable which measures how important the
operations of the rm are to the government. That is, if the government cares about what
the rm does, that rm is likely to both be inuential and face greater regulatory constraint.
Thankfully the WBES survey has a variable which proxies fairly well for how important the
rm's operations are to the government. That variable is the rms' responses to questions
about how often the government intervenes in various decisions that the rm makes. The
14Table 9: Firm Characteristics and Perceived Regulatory Constraint: Manufacturing Sector.
Full results including cut points are reported in Table 19.
Envt. Labor Trade ForEx H.Tax TaxAd.
MNC at Home -0.223 0.0751 0.199 0.0519 -0.0813 0.0619
(0.142) (0.139) (0.137) (0.146) (0.157) (0.138)
Foreign MNC 0.0202 0.0398 0.259 0.166 -0.220 0.0618
(0.135) (0.138) (0.135) (0.144) (0.141) (0.131)
Foreign non-MNC 0.0311 -0.373 0.164 0.0938 -0.206 -0.0536
(0.112) (0.117) (0.110) (0.121) (0.135) (0.123)
Exporter 0.0400 0.0370 0.401 0.205 -0.0985 -0.0383
(0.0920) (0.0919) (0.0928) (0.0946) (0.101) (0.0908)
Govt. Ownership 0.125 -0.0591 -0.214 -0.168 -0.394 -0.257
(0.129) (0.125) (0.129) (0.132) (0.134) (0.124)
Observations 2532 2594 2390 2436 2598 2602
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 10: Firm Characteristics and Perceived Regulatory Constraint: Services Sector. Full
results including cut points are reported in Table 20.
Envt. Labor Trade ForEx H.Tax TaxAd.
MNC at Home -0.0989 -0.0000687 0.523 0.361 -0.101 0.0618
(0.144) (0.133) (0.123) (0.135) (0.140) (0.126)
Foreign MNC -0.300 -0.107 0.275 0.226 -0.394 -0.100
(0.140) (0.137) (0.140) (0.131) (0.139) (0.132)
Foreign non-MNC -0.180 -0.0338 0.386 0.401 0.0164 -0.0504
(0.134) (0.134) (0.136) (0.140) (0.137) (0.130)
Exporter 0.0954 0.0933 0.556 0.353 -0.103 0.0145
(0.0943) (0.0925) (0.0907) (0.0936) (0.0971) (0.0876)
Govt. Ownership -0.197 -0.145 -0.423 -0.457 -0.751 -0.457
(0.130) (0.127) (0.139) (0.141) (0.140) (0.121)
Observations 3057 3198 2637 2869 3192 3217
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
15Table 11: Firm Characteristics and Perceived Regulatory Constraint. Full results including
cut points are reported in Table 21.
Envt. Labor Trade ForEx H.Tax TaxAd.
MNC at Home -0.166 0.0496 0.289 0.166 -0.0974 0.130
(0.0970) (0.0938) (0.0897) (0.0969) (0.103) (0.0933)
Foreign MNC -0.218 -0.0811 0.0540 0.0410 -0.418 -0.0790
(0.0988) (0.0967) (0.0970) (0.0982) (0.0982) (0.0919)
Foreign non-MNC -0.0985 -0.128 0.188 0.204 -0.0786 -0.0354
(0.0932) (0.0908) (0.0894) (0.0982) (0.104) (0.0942)
Exporter 0.00130 0.0827 0.468 0.267 -0.123 -0.0878
(0.0637) (0.0622) (0.0624) (0.0656) (0.0676) (0.0605)
Govt. Ownership -0.0460 -0.103 -0.293 -0.241 -0.508 -0.286
(0.0820) (0.0799) (0.0877) (0.0912) (0.0878) (0.0779)
Inuence Regulator 0.0502 0.0421 0.120 0.108 -0.00823 0.0155
(0.0252) (0.0256) (0.0283) (0.0280) (0.0281) (0.0246)
Observations 5738 5957 5015 5307 5961 5993
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
WBES survey asked rms about frequency of intervention in employment, wages, dividends,
mergers and acquisitions, pricing and sales. We create our proxy variable for how much the
government cares about the rm's operations by taking the negative of the average of the
intervention responses.6 The results obtained by including our proxy for how important the
rm's operations are to the government are presented in Table 12.
The results in Table 12 support our hypothesis as to the source of the endogeneity problem
in Table 11. The government intervention variable is signicant at the 1% level across all
regulatory types. The inuence variable is now insignicant for all regulatory constraints
except high taxes, for which it is now statistically signicant at the 5% level with the correct
(negative) sign.
5. Conclusion
The broad agreement among policy-makers which prevailed in the late nineties and early
two thousands about the appropriateness of providing stronger legal rights to foreign rms
through international investment agreements has been been shaken by the rapid rise in case
brought under these agreements against host governments in recent years. The argument for
6The original responses were coded in such a way that higher numbers indicated less frequent intervention.
16Table 12: Firm Characteristics and Perceived Regulatory Constraint. Full results including
cut points are reported in Table 22.
Envt. Labor Trade ForEx H.Tax TaxAd.
MNC at Home -0.190 0.0982 0.356 0.143 -0.0184 0.0971
(0.112) (0.107) (0.103) (0.113) (0.119) (0.108)
Foreign MNC -0.229 -0.0416 0.127 0.0792 -0.372 -0.0459
(0.110) (0.109) (0.106) (0.110) (0.108) (0.102)
Foreign non-MNC -0.176 -0.143 0.166 0.270 -0.0352 -0.0813
(0.105) (0.105) (0.104) (0.110) (0.121) (0.111)
Exporter 0.0687 0.117 0.456 0.246 -0.0933 -0.00486
(0.0747) (0.0728) (0.0734) (0.0765) (0.0787) (0.0714)
Govt. Ownership -0.195 -0.203 -0.470 -0.424 -0.566 -0.301
(0.105) (0.102) (0.108) (0.113) (0.110) (0.0980)
Inuence Regulator -0.00358 -0.00566 0.0465 0.0377 -0.0721 -0.0316
(0.0311) (0.0315) (0.0337) (0.0340) (0.0331) (0.0295)
g intervention -0.173 -0.163 -0.170 -0.168 -0.128 -0.133
(0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0269) (0.0265) (0.0298) (0.0259)
Observations 4116 4243 3696 3896 4242 4255
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
these agreements was largely propositioned on the idea that foreign rms are politically dis-
advantaged and therefore more likely to be subjected to regulatory takings of various forms.
Critics of international investment agreements on the other hand maintained that multina-
tional rms were politically powerful and these agreements represented further evidence of
the rules of globalization being written to these rms advantage. Using a substantial dataset
collected by the World Bank, this paper set out to see whether the claims of either side
of the debate where supported empirically. While some evidence which might explain the
perception of anti-foreign bias was found, on balance our ndings support the claims of the
critics of \corporate globalization".
An important contribution of this paper was to highlight the dierence oft-neglected
between foreign rms and multinational rms. Not all foreign-owned rms see themselves
as part of a multinational, and multinationals interact with governments both at home
and abroad.7 We nd that multinational rms have, much as globalization's critics claim,
signicantly more inuence over governments than similar rms both at home and abroad.
Non-multinational foreign rms, while not as inuential as their multinational counterparts,
7The WBES data which we use asks whether rms have operations or holdings in other countries. We
classied rms answering `yes' to this question as multinational rms.
17are still as least as inuential as purely domestic rms with similar characteristics.
Despite broadly supporting the critics view of the inuence of international rms, our
analysis does provide some clues as to the source of the perception among proponents of
investment agreements that foreign rms are politically disadvantaged. Firstly we saw that
when all sectors are pooled, domestic multinationals are more inuential than foreign multi-
nationals. Thus from the perspective of the senior executives of multinational corporations,
anti-foreign bias may seem a genuine issue. The idea that the source of this bias is essentially
political is also supported by the nding that both multinational and non-multinational for-
eign rms are relatively perceive they have relatively less inuence over the elected arms of
government (executive and legislature) than the bureaucratic arms (ministry and regulator).
Inuence, of course, is a means and not an ends. One important area that rms try to
inuence is their regulatory environment. The WBES data allowed us to test whether there
was a connection between rm inuence and perceptions of the constraint experienced in
a range of regulatory areas. Contrary to ndings in previous research, we nd no evidence
that that rm inuence leads to lower perceived regulatory constraint. To the contrary, in
some regulatory areas we nd a positive correlation between inuence and constraint.
The driver for the initially counter-intuitive result that inuence and constraint were pos-
itively correlated in some areas was found to be omitted variable bias. We posit that both
inuence and regulatory constraint are driven by the degree of interest that the government
has in the rms operations. If the rms operations are important to the government then the
government will have incentive to try to maximize the social benets from those operations
(leading to regulatory constraint) but will also want to ensure that the rm continues to op-
erate (leading to higher inuence). The question on frequency of intervention by government
in the rm's aairs provides a suitable proxy for the level of interest that the government has
in the rm's activities. Including this variable in the regulatory constraint regressions we
found that frequency of intervention was a statistically signicant determinant of regulatory
constraint. Furthermore, the inuence variable was now insignicant for most regulatory
areas and was negative and signicant with regard to tax burden. Interestingly high taxes
stood out as the area in which foreign multinationals were the least constrained relative to
all other types of rms.
Thus we conclude that the WBES data supports the claim that multinational rms are
highly inuential, and provides little or no support for the counter-claim that foreign rms
are in need of stronger legal protections. However, our analysis also cautions against the
18assumption that multinationals use their inuence over governments to achieve less constraint
in controversial areas such as environmental and labour regulations.
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6. Appendix
Table 13: Firm Characteristics and Average Inuence on
Government. Country dummies included but coecients
not reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nc av nc av nc av nc av
Foreign Ownership 1.081 0.987
(0.0789) (0.0767)
Exporter 1.315 1.271 1.256 1.259
(0.0830) (0.0813) (0.0802) (0.0804)
Govt. Ownership 1.767 1.794 1.790 1.784
(0.150) (0.153) (0.152) (0.152)
Medium 1.433 1.407 1.412 1.400
(0.0898) (0.0885) (0.0886) (0.0883)
Large 2.382 2.263 2.281 2.289
(0.206) (0.199) (0.199) (0.201)
Middle age 0.892 0.899 0.895 0.880
(0.0593) (0.0599) (0.0595) (0.0646)
Old 1.178 1.185 1.178 1.199
(0.0879) (0.0888) (0.0877) (0.100)
Services 1.391 1.375 1.364 1.366
(0.0838) (0.0833) (0.0824) (0.0824)
Other 0.767 0.699 0.745 0.764
(0.248) (0.221) (0.239) (0.250)
Agriculture 0.996 1.001 0.994 0.994
(0.113) (0.114) (0.113) (0.113)
Construction 1.209 1.197 1.187 1.190
(0.116) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115)
MNC 1.339
21(0.107)
MNC at Home 1.436 0.868
(0.147) (0.232)
Foreign MNC 1.263 1.518
(0.122) (0.318)
Foreign non-MNC 1.071 1.168
(0.105) (0.220)
MNC Home X Mid-age 1.957
(0.631)
MNC Home X Old 1.700
(0.497)
MNC Foreign X Mid-age 0.913
(0.236)
MNC Foreign X Old 0.731
(0.175)
Foreign non-MNC X Mid-age 0.893
(0.215)
Foreign non-MNC X Old 0.882
(0.209)
cut1 0.0251 0.0258 0.0256 0.0257
(0.00638) (0.00656) (0.00654) (0.00670)
cut2 0.0264 0.0271 0.0270 0.0271
(0.00671) (0.00690) (0.00687) (0.00704)
cut3 0.0289 0.0298 0.0296 0.0297
(0.00736) (0.00757) (0.00754) (0.00773)
cut4 0.0352 0.0362 0.0359 0.0361
(0.00893) (0.00918) (0.00914) (0.00937)
cut5 0.557 0.570 0.569 0.573
(0.141) (0.144) (0.144) (0.148)
cut6 0.696 0.713 0.712 0.717
(0.176) (0.180) (0.180) (0.185)
cut7 0.907 0.932 0.928 0.935
(0.229) (0.235) (0.235) (0.241)
cut8 1.116 1.148 1.145 1.153
(0.282) (0.290) (0.290) (0.298)
cut9 2.293 2.358 2.366 2.385
(0.582) (0.598) (0.601) (0.619)
cut10 2.906 2.991 2.999 3.024
(0.738) (0.760) (0.763) (0.786)
cut11 3.728 3.834 3.847 3.880
(0.949) (0.975) (0.980) (1.010)
cut12 4.347 4.469 4.485 4.525
(1.108) (1.138) (1.145) (1.180)
cut13 7.690 7.906 7.952 8.026
22(1.970) (2.025) (2.041) (2.103)
cut14 9.431 9.715 9.755 9.847
(2.406) (2.477) (2.492) (2.569)
cut15 12.08 12.48 12.50 12.62
(3.077) (3.176) (3.188) (3.288)
cut16 15.40 15.95 15.95 16.10
(3.956) (4.096) (4.100) (4.228)
cut17 29.22 30.26 30.27 30.55
(7.721) (7.993) (8.002) (8.253)
cut18 37.82 39.26 39.18 39.54
(10.13) (10.52) (10.50) (10.82)
cut19 53.89 55.32 55.81 56.34
(14.72) (15.10) (15.25) (15.70)
cut20 67.45 69.24 69.86 70.52
(18.96) (19.44) (19.63) (20.20)
Observations 5975 5938 5990 5990
Exponentiated coecients; Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 14: Interacted Firm Characteristics and Average
Inuence on Government.
(1) (2) (3)
nc av nc av nc av
MNC at Home 0.362 -0.141 0.387
(0.102) (0.267) (0.109)
Foreign MNC 0.233 0.417 0.218
(0.0968) (0.210) (0.0996)
Foreign non-MNC 0.0687 0.155 0.0793
(0.0977) (0.188) (0.104)
Exporter 0.228 0.230 0.229
(0.0638) (0.0639) (0.0638)
Govt. Ownership 0.582 0.579 0.591
(0.0850) (0.0854) (0.0948)
Medium 0.345 0.336 0.345
(0.0627) (0.0630) (0.0630)
Large 0.825 0.828 0.826
(0.0873) (0.0877) (0.0875)
Middle age -0.111 -0.128 -0.110
(0.0665) (0.0734) (0.0665)
Old 0.164 0.181 0.163
(0.0745) (0.0836) (0.0744)
Services 0.310 0.312 0.311
(0.0604) (0.0603) (0.0604)
23Other -0.294 -0.269 -0.290
(0.321) (0.328) (0.324)
Agriculture -0.00623 -0.00582 -0.00575
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114)
Construction 0.171 0.174 0.172
(0.0960) (0.0962) (0.0960)
MNC Home X Mid-age 0.671
(0.322)
MNC Home X Old 0.531
(0.293)
MNC Foreign X Mid-age -0.0914
(0.259)
MNC Foreign X Old -0.314
(0.240)
Foreign non-MNC X Mid-age -0.114
(0.240)
Foreign non-MNC X Old -0.125
(0.237)
MNC Home X Gvt -0.187
(0.296)
MNC Foreign X Gvt 0.221
(0.369)
Foreign non-MNC X Gvt -0.0663
(0.280)
cut1 -3.596 -3.605 -3.588
(0.254) (0.251) (0.255)
cut2 -3.546 -3.554 -3.538
(0.254) (0.251) (0.254)
cut3 -3.452 -3.461 -3.444
(0.254) (0.251) (0.254)
cut4 -3.258 -3.267 -3.250
(0.253) (0.250) (0.254)
cut5 -0.496 -0.502 -0.488
(0.252) (0.249) (0.253)
cut6 -0.272 -0.278 -0.264
(0.252) (0.249) (0.253)
cut7 -0.00675 -0.0126 0.00116
(0.252) (0.249) (0.253)
cut8 0.203 0.197 0.211
(0.252) (0.249) (0.253)
cut9 0.929 0.924 0.937
(0.252) (0.249) (0.253)
cut10 1.166 1.162 1.174
(0.252) (0.249) (0.253)
24cut11 1.415 1.411 1.423
(0.252) (0.249) (0.253)
cut12 1.568 1.565 1.577
(0.252) (0.249) (0.252)
cut13 2.141 2.138 2.150
(0.253) (0.250) (0.254)
cut14 2.345 2.342 2.354
(0.254) (0.251) (0.255)
cut15 2.593 2.590 2.602
(0.255) (0.252) (0.256)
cut16 2.837 2.834 2.846
(0.255) (0.252) (0.256)
cut17 3.478 3.474 3.487
(0.261) (0.258) (0.262)
cut18 3.736 3.732 3.745
(0.264) (0.262) (0.265)
cut19 4.090 4.086 4.099
(0.271) (0.269) (0.272)
cut20 4.314 4.311 4.323
(0.276) (0.274) (0.277)
Observations 5990 5990 5990
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 15: Interacted Firm Characteristics and Average
Inuence on Government. Country dummies included
but coecients not reported.
Executive Legislator Ministry Regulator
MNC at Home 1.427 1.465 1.469 1.338
(0.148) (0.151) (0.150) (0.138)
Foreign MNC 1.219 1.169 1.284 1.279
(0.120) (0.117) (0.124) (0.122)
Foreign non-MNC 0.979 0.966 1.053 1.180
(0.101) (0.0971) (0.109) (0.114)
Exporter 1.191 1.223 1.282 1.239
(0.0785) (0.0813) (0.0853) (0.0820)
Govt. Ownership 1.766 1.685 1.948 1.458
(0.163) (0.157) (0.179) (0.134)
Medium 1.320 1.253 1.335 1.359
(0.0851) (0.0822) (0.0881) (0.0847)
Large 2.141 2.016 2.237 1.965
(0.193) (0.181) (0.202) (0.173)
25Middle age 0.883 0.911 0.937 0.848
(0.0612) (0.0636) (0.0647) (0.0578)
Old 1.097 1.112 1.143 1.149
(0.0843) (0.0861) (0.0883) (0.0889)
Services 1.278 1.232 1.314 1.398
(0.0804) (0.0768) (0.0823) (0.0875)
Other 0.675 0.822 0.814 1.057
(0.241) (0.295) (0.304) (0.384)
Agriculture 1.031 0.963 0.959 0.982
(0.127) (0.117) (0.115) (0.117)
Construction 1.150 1.068 1.156 1.309
(0.114) (0.108) (0.117) (0.130)
cut1 0.0389 0.0277 0.0409 0.0397
(0.00863) (0.00542) (0.0105) (0.00772)
cut2 1.036 0.803 1.187 0.942
(0.227) (0.154) (0.302) (0.180)
cut3 3.609 2.821 3.940 2.994
(0.797) (0.542) (1.011) (0.576)
cut4 10.03 7.765 11.53 9.176
(2.258) (1.506) (2.996) (1.803)
cut5 30.26 22.98 37.23 29.57
(6.885) (4.608) (10.00) (6.058)
Observations 6074 6071 6047 6058
Exponentiated coecients; Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 16: Firm Characteristics and Inuence on Govern-
ment by Sector of Firm. Country dummies included but
coecients not reported.
Manuf. Services Agri. Constr.
MNC at Home 1.077 1.732 0.306 3.350
(0.178) (0.246) (0.451) (1.953)
Foreign MNC 1.238 1.303 1.983 1.835
(0.182) (0.184) (1.103) (1.164)
Foreign non-MNC 0.789 1.295 2.059 2.190
(0.117) (0.192) (1.043) (1.058)
Exporter 1.141 1.403 1.586 0.838
(0.114) (0.136) (0.625) (0.321)
Govt. Ownership 1.920 1.673 1.754 1.274
(0.276) (0.219) (0.636) (0.505)
Medium 1.509 1.349 1.702 1.003
(0.168) (0.123) (0.580) (0.228)
26Large 2.360 2.472 1.774 1.846
(0.343) (0.321) (0.865) (0.702)
Middle age 0.970 0.917 0.741 0.985
(0.119) (0.0875) (0.201) (0.245)
Old 1.345 1.190 0.718 2.065
(0.173) (0.134) (0.277) (0.592)
cut1 0.00776 0.0266 0.0133 0.0104
(0.00551) (0.00773) (0.0265) (0.00558)
cut2 0.00810 0.0280 0.0143 0.0107
(0.00575) (0.00813) (0.0284) (0.00572)
cut3 0.00913 0.0312 0.0145 0.0115
(0.00648) (0.00902) (0.0289) (0.00613)
cut4 0.0119 0.0360 0.0186 0.0138
(0.00843) (0.0104) (0.0370) (0.00734)
cut5 0.201 0.607 0.245 0.335
(0.142) (0.173) (0.487) (0.164)
cut6 0.259 0.758 0.290 0.433
(0.183) (0.216) (0.577) (0.210)
cut7 0.338 0.981 0.420 0.604
(0.239) (0.279) (0.837) (0.289)
cut8 0.423 1.192 0.551 0.796
(0.299) (0.339) (1.097) (0.381)
cut9 0.920 2.443 1.197 1.710
(0.651) (0.699) (2.383) (0.812)
cut10 1.184 3.124 1.398 2.131
(0.838) (0.897) (2.782) (1.020)
cut11 1.559 3.980 1.855 2.603
(1.104) (1.144) (3.690) (1.253)
cut12 1.825 4.650 2.279 2.976
(1.293) (1.342) (4.545) (1.441)
cut13 3.371 8.164 4.518 5.308
(2.391) (2.360) (8.978) (2.588)
cut14 4.057 10.29 5.772 6.266
(2.875) (2.937) (11.45) (3.007)
cut15 5.579 12.65 6.332 9.398
(3.934) (3.606) (12.52) (4.735)
cut16 6.504 16.81 8.668 14.42
(4.592) (4.850) (17.17) (7.388)
cut17 12.14 33.04 31.85 17.45
(8.622) (9.940) (63.08) (9.171)
cut18 14.80 43.11 42.50 28.96
(10.49) (13.13) (84.78) (16.71)
cut19 18.80 67.20 63.85 42.14
(13.08) (21.65) (129.4) (26.28)
27cut20 20.35 86.55 74.74
(14.21) (29.19) (54.45)
Observations 2135 2855 458 498
Exponentiated coecients; Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 17: Firm Characteristics and Inuence on Gov-
ernment by Region of Host Country. Country dummies
included but coecients not reported.
Trans.Eur. E.Asia S.Asia Lat.Am. OECD
MNC at Home 1.323 1.559 1.245 1.587 1.534
(0.254) (0.485) (0.928) (0.214) (0.437)
Foreign MNC 1.503 1.627 2.854 1.495 0.982
(0.399) (0.476) (2.459) (0.201) (0.217)
Foreign non-MNC 1.107 0.689 0.565 1.547 0.738
(0.179) (0.201) (0.450) (0.223) (0.203)
Exporter 1.347 0.870 1.187 1.102 1.076
(0.123) (0.175) (0.574) (0.105) (0.187)
Govt. Ownership 1.536 2.021 2.792 1.986 2.025
(0.151) (0.721) (1.926) (0.429) (0.500)
Medium 1.279 1.343 1.632 1.480 1.858
(0.105) (0.291) (0.820) (0.170) (0.353)
Large 2.082 1.524 1.007 2.433 3.935
(0.318) (0.399) (0.742) (0.327) (0.954)
Middle age 0.948 0.658 1.101 0.800 0.621
(0.0716) (0.157) (0.695) (0.122) (0.154)
Old 1.368 0.787 0.643 0.952 0.997
(0.152) (0.205) (0.364) (0.136) (0.227)
o.region1==2 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.region1==3 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.region1==4 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.region1==5 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.region1==6 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.region1==7 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.(region1==2)*vsfa 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
28o.(region1==4)*vsfa 1 1.000 1 1 1
(.) (0.0000110) (.) (.) (.)
o.(region1==5)*vsfa 1 1 1.000 1 1
(.) (.) (0.000112) (.) (.)
o.(region1==6)*vsfa 1 1 1 1.000 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.00000888) (.)
o.(region1==7)*vsfa 1 1 1 1 1.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (0.0000757)
o.country==23 1 1 1 0.328 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.0975) (.)
o.country==24 1 1 1 0.341 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.106) (.)
o.country==25 1 1 1 0.427 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.132) (.)
o.country==26 1 1 1 0.381 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.110) (.)
o.country==27 1 1 1 0.442 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.145) (.)
o.country==28 1 1 1 0.169 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.0549) (.)
o.country==29 1 1 1 0.261 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.0861) (.)
o.country==30 1 1 1 0.187 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.0632) (.)
o.country==31 1 1 1 0.175 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.0581) (.)
o.country==32 1 1 1 0.217 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.0688) (.)
o.country==33 1 1 1 0.309 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.103) (.)
o.country==34 1 1 1 0.564 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.183) (.)
o.country==35 1 1 1 0.306 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.0989) (.)
o.country==36 1 1 1 0.782 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.217) (.)
o.country==37 1 1 1 0.362 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.111) (.)
o.country==38 1 1 1 0.315 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.108) (.)
o.country==40 1 0.244 1 1 1
(.) (0.0793) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==41 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
29o.country==42 1 0.707 1 1 1
(.) (0.205) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==43 1 0.603 1 1 1
(.) (0.169) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==45 1 0.298 1 1 1
(.) (0.0932) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==46 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==62 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==64 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==65 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==68 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==70 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==71 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==73 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==74 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==79 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==80 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==81 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==83 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==85 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==87 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==88 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==89 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==101 1 1 1 1 0.257
(.) (.) (.) (.) (0.0879)
o.country==111 1 1 1 1 0.146
(.) (.) (.) (.) (0.0671)
30o.country==121 1 1 1 1 0.0771
(.) (.) (.) (.) (0.0283)
o.country==131 1 1 1 1 0.418
(.) (.) (.) (.) (0.141)
o.country==141 1 1 1 1 0.661
(.) (.) (.) (.) (0.203)
o.country==151 1 1 1 1 0.196
(.) (.) (.) (.) (0.0667)
o.country==161 1 1 1 1 0.148
(.) (.) (.) (.) (0.0492)
o.country==170 1 1 1 0.196 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.0639) (.)
o.country==180 1 1 1 0.237 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.0701) (.)
o.country==191 1 1 1 1 0.249
(.) (.) (.) (.) (0.0839)
o.country==200 1 1 1 0.320 1
(.) (.) (.) (0.0960) (.)
o.country==211 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==220 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==501 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==503 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==504 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==505 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==506 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==2007 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
o.country==2026 1 1 1 1 1
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
cut1 0.173 0.185 0.607 0.526 0.393
(0.0189) (0.0583) (0.293) (0.146) (0.132)
cut2 0.183 0.222 0.723 0.681 0.435
(0.0198) (0.0690) (0.348) (0.189) (0.146)
cut3 0.201 0.281 0.809 0.831 0.593
(0.0216) (0.0864) (0.396) (0.231) (0.198)
cut4 0.247 0.334 1.120 0.979 0.768
(0.0263) (0.102) (0.556) (0.272) (0.258)
31cut5 2.323 0.755 1.313 2.110 2.062
(0.250) (0.226) (0.663) (0.592) (0.692)
cut6 3.004 0.846 1.897 2.772 2.533
(0.326) (0.252) (0.999) (0.783) (0.856)
cut7 4.042 1.056 2.629 3.610 3.154
(0.444) (0.315) (1.426) (1.024) (1.058)
cut8 5.114 1.179 4.662 4.217 3.629
(0.572) (0.352) (2.641) (1.203) (1.224)
cut9 9.395 2.196 5.901 7.500 5.692
(1.113) (0.665) (3.295) (2.176) (1.924)
cut10 12.46 2.790 6.438 8.844 7.756
(1.530) (0.850) (3.469) (2.587) (2.614)
cut11 15.98 3.162 9.640 11.26 11.66
(2.028) (0.980) (5.582) (3.352) (3.864)
cut12 19.18 4.389 23.95 13.14 13.24
(2.526) (1.398) (17.87) (3.916) (4.377)
cut13 35.86 11.03 41.03 19.48 27.14
(5.309) (3.862) (36.56) (6.003) (10.12)
cut14 42.35 13.55 62.29 24.39 35.95
(6.521) (4.931) (61.38) (7.600) (13.66)
cut15 55.80 17.40 125.9 35.22 47.11
(9.347) (6.745) (159.1) (11.45) (18.72)
cut16 77.46 21.97 41.24 67.82









Observations 3293 437 82 1955 698
Exponentiated coecients; Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 18: Firm Characteristics and Perceived Regulatory
Constraint. Country dummies included but coecients
not reported.
Envt. Labor Trade ForEx H.Tax TaxAd.
MNC at Home -0.155 0.0479 0.380 0.274 -0.0874 0.104
(0.0915) (0.0882) (0.0841) (0.0913) (0.0958) (0.0867)
32Foreign MNC -0.173 -0.0732 0.233 0.145 -0.356 -0.0700
(0.0906) (0.0905) (0.0904) (0.0899) (0.0920) (0.0855)
Foreign non-MNC -0.119 -0.219 0.258 0.231 -0.110 -0.0770
(0.0812) (0.0817) (0.0792) (0.0845) (0.0893) (0.0827)
Exporter 0.0326 0.0519 0.489 0.268 -0.0943 -0.0273
(0.0590) (0.0582) (0.0581) (0.0604) (0.0622) (0.0564)
Govt. Ownership -0.0186 -0.117 -0.259 -0.217 -0.503 -0.277
(0.0788) (0.0767) (0.0831) (0.0858) (0.0839) (0.0755)
Medium 0.230 0.243 0.148 0.124 0.0531 0.0700
(0.0584) (0.0578) (0.0626) (0.0643) (0.0643) (0.0575)
Large 0.378 0.212 0.0704 0.0187 -0.148 -0.0813
(0.0805) (0.0771) (0.0813) (0.0847) (0.0846) (0.0765)
Middle age -0.00793 0.0699 0.0807 0.0354 0.0531 0.0181
(0.0615) (0.0608) (0.0662) (0.0673) (0.0659) (0.0597)
Old 0.0776 0.141 -0.0212 -0.0784 0.0614 -0.0848
(0.0694) (0.0697) (0.0742) (0.0758) (0.0760) (0.0696)
Services -0.474 -0.161 -0.0548 0.00256 -0.203 -0.0951
(0.0566) (0.0564) (0.0597) (0.0596) (0.0608) (0.0547)
Other -0.497 0.0418 -0.934 -0.586 -0.185 -0.105
(0.337) (0.310) (0.388) (0.348) (0.301) (0.277)
Agriculture 0.186 0.154 -0.0122 -0.382 -0.350 -0.0831
(0.108) (0.107) (0.127) (0.142) (0.122) (0.110)
Construction 0.159 0.242 -0.301 -0.117 -0.00324 0.234
(0.0861) (0.0902) (0.0997) (0.104) (0.107) (0.0889)
cut1 -0.376 -1.448 -0.0312 0.124 -2.377 -2.962
(0.378) (0.204) (0.284) (0.223) (0.256) (0.376)
cut2 0.905 -0.0628 1.023 1.232 -1.389 -1.776
(0.379) (0.204) (0.285) (0.223) (0.254) (0.374)
cut3 2.373 1.476 2.531 2.429 -0.115 -0.313
(0.381) (0.205) (0.287) (0.225) (0.253) (0.374)
Observations 6645 6886 5875 6191 6883 6918
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 19: Firm Characteristics and Perceived Regulatory
Constraint: Manufacturing Sector. Country dummies in-
cluded but coecients not reported.
Envt. Labor Trade ForEx H.Tax TaxAd.
MNC at Home -0.223 0.0751 0.199 0.0519 -0.0813 0.0619
(0.142) (0.139) (0.137) (0.146) (0.157) (0.138)
Foreign MNC 0.0202 0.0398 0.259 0.166 -0.220 0.0618
(0.135) (0.138) (0.135) (0.144) (0.141) (0.131)
33Foreign non-MNC 0.0311 -0.373 0.164 0.0938 -0.206 -0.0536
(0.112) (0.117) (0.110) (0.121) (0.135) (0.123)
Exporter 0.0400 0.0370 0.401 0.205 -0.0985 -0.0383
(0.0920) (0.0919) (0.0928) (0.0946) (0.101) (0.0908)
Govt. Ownership 0.125 -0.0591 -0.214 -0.168 -0.394 -0.257
(0.129) (0.125) (0.129) (0.132) (0.134) (0.124)
Medium 0.106 0.158 0.247 0.110 0.119 0.0292
(0.103) (0.0996) (0.108) (0.112) (0.113) (0.103)
Large 0.241 0.134 0.165 -0.0374 -0.125 -0.117
(0.130) (0.127) (0.131) (0.141) (0.139) (0.129)
Middle age 0.0773 0.0586 0.108 0.0554 0.189 0.0663
(0.109) (0.112) (0.115) (0.122) (0.118) (0.108)
Old 0.121 0.163 -0.0927 -0.109 0.122 -0.114
(0.117) (0.125) (0.125) (0.132) (0.128) (0.120)
cut1 -1.245 -1.488 0.595 -0.601 -1.869 -1.134
(0.256) (0.264) (0.761) (0.196) (0.462) (0.202)
cut2 0.123 -0.0840 1.845 0.548 -0.786 0.189
(0.255) (0.264) (0.763) (0.196) (0.460) (0.201)
cut3 1.737 1.445 3.500 1.847 0.522 1.690
(0.258) (0.266) (0.765) (0.201) (0.459) (0.204)
Observations 2532 2594 2390 2436 2598 2602
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 20: Firm Characteristics and Perceived Regulatory
Constraint: Services Sector. Country dummies included
but coecients not reported.
Envt. Labor Trade ForEx H.Tax TaxAd.
MNC at Home -0.0989 -0.0000687 0.523 0.361 -0.101 0.0618
(0.144) (0.133) (0.123) (0.135) (0.140) (0.126)
Foreign MNC -0.300 -0.107 0.275 0.226 -0.394 -0.100
(0.140) (0.137) (0.140) (0.131) (0.139) (0.132)
Foreign non-MNC -0.180 -0.0338 0.386 0.401 0.0164 -0.0504
(0.134) (0.134) (0.136) (0.140) (0.137) (0.130)
Exporter 0.0954 0.0933 0.556 0.353 -0.103 0.0145
(0.0943) (0.0925) (0.0907) (0.0936) (0.0971) (0.0876)
Govt. Ownership -0.197 -0.145 -0.423 -0.457 -0.751 -0.457
(0.130) (0.127) (0.139) (0.141) (0.140) (0.121)
Medium 0.364 0.313 0.0162 0.101 -0.00123 0.0634
(0.0861) (0.0854) (0.0904) (0.0928) (0.0946) (0.0853)
Large 0.466 0.329 -0.0797 0.0712 -0.288 -0.0608
(0.127) (0.116) (0.127) (0.124) (0.127) (0.118)
34Middle age -0.0353 0.0102 0.0723 0.0143 -0.0329 -0.0161
(0.0925) (0.0886) (0.0948) (0.0962) (0.0939) (0.0869)
Old 0.0559 0.0383 0.168 0.145 0.0131 -0.0671
(0.106) (0.103) (0.110) (0.110) (0.113) (0.103)
cut1 -0.382 -1.330 -0.998 -0.0972 -3.760 -1.728
(0.566) (0.238) (0.655) (0.720) (0.574) (0.325)
cut2 0.849 0.0880 -0.00556 1.056 -2.794 -0.610
(0.567) (0.238) (0.655) (0.721) (0.571) (0.322)
cut3 2.227 1.662 1.406 2.280 -1.459 0.876
(0.569) (0.241) (0.655) (0.720) (0.571) (0.322)
Observations 3057 3198 2637 2869 3192 3217
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 21: Firm Characteristics and Perceived Regulatory
Constraint. Country dummies included but coecients
not reported.
Envt. Labor Trade ForEx H.Tax TaxAd.
MNC at Home -0.166 0.0496 0.289 0.166 -0.0974 0.130
(0.0970) (0.0938) (0.0897) (0.0969) (0.103) (0.0933)
Foreign MNC -0.218 -0.0811 0.0540 0.0410 -0.418 -0.0790
(0.0988) (0.0967) (0.0970) (0.0982) (0.0982) (0.0919)
Foreign non-MNC -0.0985 -0.128 0.188 0.204 -0.0786 -0.0354
(0.0932) (0.0908) (0.0894) (0.0982) (0.104) (0.0942)
Exporter 0.00130 0.0827 0.468 0.267 -0.123 -0.0878
(0.0637) (0.0622) (0.0624) (0.0656) (0.0676) (0.0605)
Govt. Ownership -0.0460 -0.103 -0.293 -0.241 -0.508 -0.286
(0.0820) (0.0799) (0.0877) (0.0912) (0.0878) (0.0779)
Medium 0.208 0.215 0.0804 0.0698 0.0385 0.0651
(0.0628) (0.0615) (0.0674) (0.0697) (0.0708) (0.0616)
Large 0.368 0.129 -0.00839 -0.0712 -0.208 -0.111
(0.0875) (0.0830) (0.0876) (0.0917) (0.0920) (0.0810)
Middle age 0.00453 0.0486 0.0909 0.0373 -0.00106 0.0288
(0.0667) (0.0654) (0.0721) (0.0732) (0.0726) (0.0644)
Old 0.117 0.181 0.00419 -0.0475 0.0168 -0.0797
(0.0751) (0.0752) (0.0810) (0.0825) (0.0837) (0.0745)
Services -0.500 -0.152 -0.0843 -0.0421 -0.258 -0.174
(0.0613) (0.0610) (0.0651) (0.0650) (0.0672) (0.0590)
Other -0.460 0.0919 -0.867 -0.562 -0.142 -0.0942
(0.335) (0.311) (0.387) (0.352) (0.301) (0.273)
Agriculture 0.160 0.216 -0.0332 -0.451 -0.298 -0.145
(0.111) (0.111) (0.130) (0.148) (0.128) (0.113)
35Construction 0.139 0.289 -0.283 -0.112 0.00108 0.214
(0.0893) (0.0944) (0.108) (0.112) (0.117) (0.0948)
Inuence Regulator 0.0502 0.0421 0.120 0.108 -0.00823 0.0155
(0.0252) (0.0256) (0.0283) (0.0280) (0.0281) (0.0246)
cut1 -1.087 -0.789 -1.003 -0.467 -2.790 -2.286
(0.205) (0.256) (0.230) (0.210) (0.237) (0.214)
cut2 0.140 0.586 0.0304 0.617 -1.801 -1.143
(0.204) (0.256) (0.230) (0.210) (0.235) (0.213)
cut3 1.592 2.133 1.533 1.816 -0.543 0.329
(0.205) (0.258) (0.231) (0.212) (0.233) (0.212)
Observations 5738 5957 5015 5307 5961 5993
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 22: Firm Characteristics and Perceived Regulatory
Constraint. Country dummies included but coecients
not reported.
Envt. Labor Trade ForEx H.Tax TaxAd.
MNC at Home -0.166 0.0496 0.289 0.166 -0.0974 0.130
(0.0970) (0.0938) (0.0897) (0.0969) (0.103) (0.0933)
Foreign MNC -0.218 -0.0811 0.0540 0.0410 -0.418 -0.0790
(0.0988) (0.0967) (0.0970) (0.0982) (0.0982) (0.0919)
Foreign non-MNC -0.0985 -0.128 0.188 0.204 -0.0786 -0.0354
(0.0932) (0.0908) (0.0894) (0.0982) (0.104) (0.0942)
Exporter 0.00130 0.0827 0.468 0.267 -0.123 -0.0878
(0.0637) (0.0622) (0.0624) (0.0656) (0.0676) (0.0605)
Govt. Ownership -0.0460 -0.103 -0.293 -0.241 -0.508 -0.286
(0.0820) (0.0799) (0.0877) (0.0912) (0.0878) (0.0779)
Medium 0.208 0.215 0.0804 0.0698 0.0385 0.0651
(0.0628) (0.0615) (0.0674) (0.0697) (0.0708) (0.0616)
Large 0.368 0.129 -0.00839 -0.0712 -0.208 -0.111
(0.0875) (0.0830) (0.0876) (0.0917) (0.0920) (0.0810)
Middle age 0.00453 0.0486 0.0909 0.0373 -0.00106 0.0288
(0.0667) (0.0654) (0.0721) (0.0732) (0.0726) (0.0644)
Old 0.117 0.181 0.00419 -0.0475 0.0168 -0.0797
(0.0751) (0.0752) (0.0810) (0.0825) (0.0837) (0.0745)
Services -0.500 -0.152 -0.0843 -0.0421 -0.258 -0.174
(0.0613) (0.0610) (0.0651) (0.0650) (0.0672) (0.0590)
Other -0.460 0.0919 -0.867 -0.562 -0.142 -0.0942
(0.335) (0.311) (0.387) (0.352) (0.301) (0.273)
Agriculture 0.160 0.216 -0.0332 -0.451 -0.298 -0.145
(0.111) (0.111) (0.130) (0.148) (0.128) (0.113)
36Construction 0.139 0.289 -0.283 -0.112 0.00108 0.214
(0.0893) (0.0944) (0.108) (0.112) (0.117) (0.0948)
Inuence Regulator 0.0502 0.0421 0.120 0.108 -0.00823 0.0155
(0.0252) (0.0256) (0.0283) (0.0280) (0.0281) (0.0246)
cut1 -1.087 -0.789 -1.003 -0.467 -2.790 -2.286
(0.205) (0.256) (0.230) (0.210) (0.237) (0.214)
cut2 0.140 0.586 0.0304 0.617 -1.801 -1.143
(0.204) (0.256) (0.230) (0.210) (0.235) (0.213)
cut3 1.592 2.133 1.533 1.816 -0.543 0.329
(0.205) (0.258) (0.231) (0.212) (0.233) (0.212)
Observations 5738 5957 5015 5307 5961 5993
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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